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REHABILITATION OR REVENGE: PROSECUTING 




International law provides no explicit guidelines for whether or at 
what age child soldiers should be prosecuted for grave violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law such as genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Due to increasing numbers of 
children participating in armed conflict and engaging in serious hu-
man rights breaches, 1 a coherent policy response consistent with 
international legal standards, including states' duties to promote chil-
dren's well-being and to prevent and prosecute human rights abuses, is 
necessary. This paper argues that the hundreds of thousands of chil-
dren under age eighteen2 participating in armed conflicts around the 
globe should be treated primarily as victims, not perpetrators, of 
human rights violations and that international law may support this 
conclusion. In the case of children, the world community should 
choose rehabilitation and reintegration over criminal prosecution 
because of children's unique psychological and moral development,3 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child's emphasis on promoting 
the best interests of the child,4 and the damaging psychological effects 
* Associate, Foley Hoag LLP. BA., Harvard College;J.D., Harvard Law School. © 2007, Nienke 
Grossman. I wish to thank Claudio Grossman, Martha Minow, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Ezequiel 
Steiner for helpful comments on drafts of this Article and for encouraging me to publish it 
1. See generally Expert of the Secretary-General, Ms. Graca Machel, Impact of Anned Conflict on 
Children, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 108,1. 40, U.N. Doc. A/51/30G (199G) [hereinafter 
Machel Report]. 
2. Amnesty Int'l, Child Soldiers: One of the W=t Abuses of Child Labor, AI Index lOR 42/01/99, 
Jan. 1999, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library /Index/ eng10R420011999. 
3. See generally Joseph Adelson, The Political Imagination of the Young Adolescent, in TwELVE TO 
SIXTEEN: EARLy ADOLESCENCE 106 Gerome Kagan & Robert Coles eds., 1972). This study examined 
the views of 450 boys and girls from West Germany, the United States, and Great Britain. Findings 
did not vary significantly by sex or by nationality. Id. See infra Part IlIA. 
4. Convention on the Rights of the Child part I, art. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 
I.L.M. 1456 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRe] ("In all actions concerning 
children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration ... ."). 
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that trials may have on children forced to recount violence done to 
them and others.5 
The political science paradigms of Liberalism and Institutionalism 
are instructive in crafting a strategy to achieve specific policy goals,6 
such as setting an age of criminal responsibility for child soldiers 
engaged in human rights abuses and promoting their rehabilitation. If, 
as Institutionalism posits, institutions or international norms have an 
independent impact on states' policy choices,7 creating explicit, uni-
form standards at the international level for the disposition of child 
soldiers accused of human rights violations may encourage states to 
better promote the welfare of former child soldiers. Under the Liberal 
weltanschauung,8 non-state actors such as international child advocates 
and non-governmental organizations may playa role in both shaping 
and encouraging compliance with these new standards at the domestic 
and international levels. Further, both Liberals and Institutionalists 
may undercut the problem of prosecuting former child soldiers by 
focusing increased efforts on eradicating the use of child soldiers 
altogether. 
Mter providing background information on child soldiers in Part I, 
Part II of this Article analyzes the current legal framework under 
international humanitarian, human rights, and criminal law, and the 
international law of the child, considering both a state's duty to 
prosecute perpetrators of international crimes and its affirmative obli-
gations to rehabilitate and reintegrate former child soldiers into soci-
ety. Next, Part III formulates a policy proposal for filling lacunae in the 
law, suggesting in particular that children under age eighteen should 
not be prosecuted for international crimes, and instead, should be 
treated primarily as victims of armed conflict. Part III also examines 
how the differing assumptions of the international relations paradigms 
of Liberalism and Institutionalism affect strategies for achieving this 
policy goal, and it provides other solutions for addressing the problem 
of child soldiers who commit atrocities. In conclusion, this paper 
5. See Ilene Cohn, The Protection of Children in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Processes, 12 HARv. 
HUM. RTS.J. 129, 18().81 (1999). See infra Part I1I.A. 
6. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations-The Technology: 
Principal Theories of International Relations, 285 RECUEIL DES COURS 21, 21-54 (2000) [hereinafter 
Hague Lecture IJ. See infra Part III.B. 
7. Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 J. INT'L SEC. 39, 
41-42 (1995). See infra Part II1.B. 
8. See generally Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513 (1997). 
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emphasizes our responsibilities to make this a world "fit for children."g 
PART I. THE BASICS ON CHILD SOLDIERS 
We are the world's children. 
We are the victims of exploitation and abuse. 
We are street children. 
We are the children of war. 
We are the victims and orphans ofHIV / AIDS. 
We are denied good-quality education and health care. 
We are victims of political, economic, cultural, religious and 
environmen tal discrimination. 
We are children whose voices are not being heard: it is time 
we are taken into account. 
We want a world fit for children, because a world fit for us is a 
world fit for everyone.10 
Over 300,0001l children under age eighteen actively participate in 
armed conflict in 4112 countries across the globe, according to the 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, a group of six non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs") including Amnesty Interna-
tional and Human Rights Watch. An additional 200,000 children are 
recruited into paramilitary and guerilla groups and civil militias in 
more than 87 countries.13 Paramilitary groups in Colombia have re-
cruited children as young as eight years old; eleven-year olds have been 
drafted into the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan; and teenage boys 
are frequently forced from their villages into the national army in 
9. Press Release, UNICEF, Children's Forum Message (May 8,2002) [hereinafter Statement 
of Children], http://www.unicef.org/specialsession/press/cfmessage.htm. Reference to state-
ment drafted, debated, and agreed to by the 400 delegates to the Children's Forum, part of the 
United Nations Special Session on Children, taking place from May 8-10,2002; delegates included 
children from 100 countries. [d. See also Press Release, UNICEF, Children Issue Statement to 
World Leaders at the U.N. (May 10, 2002), http://www.unicef.org/specialsession/press/ 
02pr26cf.htm. 
10. Statement of Children, supra note 9. 
11. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 2, at 1; see also Repurt of the SPecial Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and A17TII!d Conflict, t 5, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/60/335 
(Sept. 7, 2005) (stating that over 250,000 children are exploited as child soldiers). 
12. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Child Soldiers: Global Survey Shows New Trends 
Uune 12,2001), http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/06/childsoI612.htm. 
13. [d. 
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Myanmar.14 Despite demobilizations of child soldiers in Sierra Leone 
and Southern Sudan,15 the use of child soldiers is most prevalent in 
Mrica, with more than 120,000 children engaged in active combat. 16 
Children are involved in soldiering in the developed world as well; 
about 7,000 children under the age of eighteen were in the British 
Armed Forces in June 2001P Children are increasingly participating 
in internal armed conflicts,18 and the more protracted the conflict, the 
higher the likelihood of child participation.19 
Children enter armed conflicts either involuntarily, through the 
threat or use of violence against them or their loved ones,20 or 
"voluntarily," due to dire poverty, feelings of helplessness and vulnerabil-
ity, peer pressure, or the desire for revenge.21 In Northern Uganda 
from 1995 to 1997, between five and eight thousand children were 
abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army to serve as child soldiers22-
some were even taken directly from schoo1.23 Similarly, the army 
surrounded and forcibly conscripted groups of school children in 
Burma between the ages of fifteen and seventeen, according to a U.N. 
report.24 Young soldiers may be abducted or recruited from the con-
flict areas themselves, second countries, refugee communities, ethnic 
14. US Rntification of the Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Hearing 
Before the u.s. Foreign Relations Comm., 107th Congo (2002) (statement of Jo Becker, Advocacy 
Director, Children's Rights Division, Human Rights Watch) [hereinafter Becker], available at 
http://www.hIW.org/press/2002/03/childsoldiers0307.htm. 
15. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Key Findings of the Global Report on Child Soldiers 
2001 (2002), http://www.hIW.org/campaigns/crp/cs-report2001.htm. 
16. Nicol Degli Innocenti, 'About 800,000 Children' Used as Soldiers, FIN. TIMES, June 13, 
2001, at 10; see COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, SOME FACfS (2006), http:/ / 
www.child·soldiers.org/childsoldiers/some-facts(estimatingthat.in 2004, there were "up to 
100,000 children, some as young as nine" involved in armed conflict). 
17. Id. 
18. See ILENE CoHN & GlN S. GoODWIN-·GILL, CHILD SOLDIERS: THE ROLE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED 
CoNFLICT 23 (Clarendon Press 1994). 
19. Machel Report, supra note 1, 'I 40; see also CoALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, 
CHILD SOLDIERS: AN OVERVIEW (2001) [hereinafter COALITION I], http://www.child-soldiers.org/ 
report2001/PRE_OVERVIEW.html#IMPACT. 
20. COHN & GoODWIN-GILL, supra note 18, at 24. 
21. Id. at 31-43. 
22. See Amnesty Int'l, "Breaking God's commands": the Destruction of Childhood by the Lord's 
Resistance Army 1, AI Index AFR 59/001/1997, Sept. 18, 1997 (citing Carol Bellamy, Executive 
Director of United Nations Children's Fund). 
23. Id. at 5 ("On 25 July 1996, 23 girls were abducted from St Mary's College and on 21 
August 39 boys from Sir Samuel Baker School .... On 10 October 1996 ... 139 girls were 
abducted from St Mary's College ... ."). 
24. Machel Report, supra note 1, '137. 
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Diasporas or by trafficking across borders.25 Children are considered 
particularly desirable recruits because they are more easily intimidated 
and physically vulnerable than adult soldiers.26 
Once they become soldiers, children may suffer from a variety of 
physical health risks, as they are frequently given the most dangerous 
jobs. Many fight on the front lines, facilitated by increasingly light-
weight weapons that they can carry,27 facing the conventional dangers 
of injury and death during armed conflict. Of the 140 Liberation Tigers 
Tamil Eelaam (LITE) soldiers killed during a battle at Ampakamam, 
Sri Lanka in October 1999, 49 were children; 32 of those children were 
girls between the ages of eleven and fifteen. 28 Other children are used 
as spies, messengers, porters, and servants.29 In Myanmar, children 
were used to sweep roads with tree branches or brooms to detect 
landmines.30 One child soldier in Uganda innocently recounts how he 
was trained to place landmines: 
I was not trained in their names-I was shown how to use them. 
There are three different kinds. Small ones, which open like a 
mathematical set, for use against people. Then there are round 
ones, which are set off by 70-80 kilos-a bicycle will make them 
explode. And big ones, the size of a small washing basin, which 
are for heavy vehicles .... 31 
In addition to engaging in combat and other tasks the boys partici-
pate in, girls are also frequently victims of sexual exploitation through 
rape, sexual slavery, and abuse.32 Younger children often are malnour-
ished and may suffer from respiratory and skin infections.33 It is likely 
that child soldiers are at higher risks of drug and alcohol abuse, 
sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancy, and auditory and visual impair-
25. Human Rights Watch, supra note 12. 
26. See Human Rights Watch, Facts About Child Soldiers, http://www.hlW.org/ campaigns/ 
crp/facUheet.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). 
27. CoALmON I, supra note 19. 
28. CoALmON TO STOP THE USE OF CHll.D SOLDIERS, GIRlS WITH GUNS: AN AGENDA ON CHll.D 
SOLDIERS FOR "BEIJING PLUS FIVE", http://www.child-soldiers.org/themed_reports/beijin~ 
plus.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). 
29. CoALmON I, supra note 19. 
30. Human Rights Watch, supra note 15. 
31. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 22, at 8. 
32. CoALmON I, supra note 19. 
33.Id. 
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ments from frequent exposure to landmines.34 
The psychological trauma of soldiering is undoubtedly severe. Robbed 
of their childhood, these children witness the worst of humanity on a 
daily basis. One thirteen-year-old from Sierra Leone described his first 
day of combat with children eight and nine years old, dragging their 
AK-47's because they were too heavy to carry: 
I was in an ambush and bullets were flying back and forth, 
people were shooting. I didn't want to pull the trigger at all but 
when you watch kids ... being shot and killed and ... dying 
and crying and their blood was spilling all over your face you 
just moved beyond, something just pushed you and you start 
pulling the trigger.35 
A Ugandan girl abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda was 
forced to kill a boy who tried to escape, witnessed another boy hacked 
to death, and was beaten when she dropped a water container and ran 
for cover under gunfire.36 Brutal hazing practices include everything 
from torture and beatings inflicted upon the new recruit to forcing him 
or her to commit these atrocities on others. The Mozambican Resis-
tance Organization's (RENAMO) training regimen included physical 
abuse, punishment for showing sympathy for victims of violence, and 
forced participation in killing.37 Children exposed to rampant violence 
and death through involvement in armed conflict may suffer flash-
backs, nightmares, sleep disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder, 
in addition to desiring revenge and fearing retribution from the 
communities they have hurt.38 
Although these children are themselves victims of violence, they are 
also perpetrators of atrocities. Once they become child soldiers, these 
children murder, maim, and plunder. Graca Machel, a former Expert 
of the Secretary General of the U.N. on the impact of armed conflict on 
children, wrote that children from countries including Mghanistan, 
Mozambique, Colombia, and Nicaragua, sometimes committed atroci-
ties against their own families and communities.39 The children in 
Uganda'S Lord's Resistance Army were both brutally abused and 
34. Id. 
35. Becker, supra note 14. 
36. Amnesty In!'l, supra note 22, at 1. 
37. See COHN & GoODWIN-GU..L, supra note 18, at 93 n.l. 
38. Id. at 101>-11. 
39. See Machel Report, supra note 1,148. 
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abusive, killing attempted escapees, captured government soldiers, and 
civilians, using everything from stones to axes.40 Children as young as 
five were accused of participating in the Rwandan genocide.41 
Deciding what to do with these children once the conflict ends is a 
daunting task; the government(s) involved must fulfill international 
humanitarian, human rights, and criminal law commitments to both 
the former child soldiers and their victims. While working to reinte-
grate the children into their communities, continuing their educa-
tions, and helping them overcome the psychological and physical 
injuries ofwar,42 governments must address the concerns of the victims 
of war crimes and their families, as well as the challenges of national 
healing after conflict. At least as late as 1996, no peace treaty had ever 
explicitly recognized the existence of child soldiers.43 States, particu-
larly in Mrica, are squarely faced with the problem of what to do with 
children who committed serious violations of international humanitar-
ian law. Despite the strong opposition of international child advocates, 
in October 2000, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan en-
dorsed a proposal for a Sierra Leone war crimes tribunal with jurisdic-
tion over children aged fifteen to eighteen.44 In May 2001, the Govern-
ment of Congo sought to execute four child soldiers for violations 
committed under age eighteen, according to Human Rights Watch.45 
Only 1,50046 of the approximately 4,00047 children accused of partici-
pating in the Rwandan genocide had been released from detention as 
of November 14, 2001. 
40. Anmesty Int'l, supra note 22, at I, 14. 
41. Chen Reis, Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications oj Prosecuting Children Jor 
Participation in Internal Armed Conflict, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 629, 629 (1997), citing United 
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Rwanda: Special Report-Children in Prison, June 10, 1995, 
http://www.oneworld.org/ chrwanda/ chrawandaprison boy. hUnI. 
42. See Machel Report, supra note 1, '1'149-57. 
43. Id. 'I 49. 
44. Colum Lynch, Prosecution oj Minors For War Crimes Urged; u.N. ChieJ Backs Sierra Leone's 
Stand, WASH. Posr, Oct. 6, 2000, atA28. 
45. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Congo: Don't Execute Child Soldiers (2001), 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/05/congo0502.hUn. Although this author looked for follow-up 
information about what happened to these four children, she was unable to find any. 
46. Rwanda: Government Frees 552 Child Genocide Suspects, AFRICA NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 14, 2001. 
47. Rwanda: Genocide Trials oJ Youth to be Sped Up, LA TiMES, Aug. 13,2000, atAl3. 
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PART II. INTERNATIONAL LAw ON PROSECUTING CHILD SOLDIERS48 
A. States' Obligations to Child Soldiers 
International humanitarian law, or the "laws of war" that seek to 
regulate behavior during international and internal armed conflict, 
and the international law of the child explicitly prohibit the recruit-
ment and use of children under age fifteen in armed conflict. Article 
38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC") commits 
States Parties to refrain from using or recruiting children under age 
fifteen in their armed forces, and when recruiting children aged fifteen 
to eighteen, to prefer the oldest children.49 This is consistent with 
Article 77 of the Protocol Additional (No. I) to the Geneva Conven-
tions Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts, 50 and Part II, Article 4 of the Protocol Additional (No. II) to 
the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
48. The sources of international law are provided in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of justice: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59,judicial decisions and the teach-
ings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsid-
iary means for the determinations of rules of law. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et 
bono, if the parties agree thereto. 
Statute of the International Court of justice art. 38,june 26,1945,59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993 (1945). 
49. CRC, supra note 4, art. 38. 
[d. 
1. States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of international 
humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the child. 
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not 
attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities. 
3. States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of 
fifteen years into their armed forces ... 
50. Protocol Additional (No. I) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts art. 77,june 8, 1977, 1125 V.N.T.S. 
3. 
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Non-International Armed Conflicts,51 The prohibition on the "use" of 
children under fifteen suggests children under fifteen may not volun-
teer to participate directly in armed conflict. 52 The CRC has been 
ratified by 190 states-every country in the world except Somalia and 
the United States.53 
In recent years, various international treaties have sought to raise the 
age of permitted participation in armed conflict to eighteen years. For 
example, the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict amended the age of allowable direct 
participation in hostilities to eighteen years for Parties to the Protocol, 
stating that "States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that 
members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 
[d. 
1. Children shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected against any fonn 
of indecent assault. The Parties to the conflict shall provide them with the care and aide 
they require, whether because oftheir age or for any other reason. 
2. The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who 
have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in 
particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their anned forces. In recruiting 
among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not 
attained the age of eighteen years the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to give 
priority to those who are oldest. 
3. If, in exceptional cases, despite the provisions of paragraph 2, children who have not 
attained the age of fifteen years take a direct part in hostilities and fall into the power of 
an adverse Party, they shall continue to benefit from the special protection accorded by 
this Article, whether or not they are prisoners of war. 
51. Protocol Additional (No. II) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Anned Conflicts art. 4, June 8, 1977, 1125 
V.N.T.S.609 [hereinafter Protocol II]. 
[d. 
3. Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in 
particular ... 
(c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither 
be recruited in the armed forces, or groups nor allowed to take part in 
hostilities; 
(d) the special protection provided by this Article to children who have 
not attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they 
take a direct part in hostilities despite the provisions of subparagraph (c) and 
are captured ... 
52. Seeid. 
53. Cohn, supra note 5, at 195 n.1. 
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eighteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities.,,54 Although a 
child beneath age eighteen may not be compulsorily drafted into a 
Party's armed forces,55 a child may still volunteer to join a state's armed 
forces as long as he or she is not participating directly in hostilities. The 
Optional Protocol is stricter with respect to armed groups distinct from 
a state's armed forces since these must refrain from both using and 
recruiting children under eighteen,56 suggesting children aged fifteen 
to eighteen may not join armed opposition groups although they may 
join the state's armed forces voluntarily. As of March 2007, 122 states 
were signatories, and 110 were parties to the Optional Protocol to the 
CRC.57 
The I.L.O. Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate 
Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor ("I.L.O. 
Convention 182") defines a child as a person under the age of eighteen 
and includes "forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in 
armed conflict" as a worst form of child labor for all countries to work 
toward eradicating, but does not address voluntary participation. 58 The 
54. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, art. I, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 
49, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000) (entered into force Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Optional Protocol to 
the CRC]. "Article 1: States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their 
armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities." [d. 
55. [d. arts. 1-3. "Article 2: States Parties shall ensure that persons who have not attained the 
age of 18 years are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces." [d. 
[d. 
56. [d. art. 4. 
1. Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under 
any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years. 
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, 
including the adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such 
practices. 
57. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations, 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/ll_b.htm (last visited Mar. 
17,2007). 
58. Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labour (I.L.O. No. 182), arts. 1-3,June 17, 1999, 38I.L.M. 1207 (1999) 
(entered into force Nov. 19,2000) [hereinafter I.L.O. Convention 182]. 
332 
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Mrican Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child defines a child 
as a person under age eighteen and calls on all Mrican States to take 
action to "ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and 
refrain in particular, from recruiting any child.,,59 Since the Charter 
applies to children in situations of "internal armed conflicts, tension 
and strife,,60 in addition to international conflict, and proposes that 
children shall not take a direct part in hostilities, it suggests that 
children under eighteen should not be allowed to volunteer to engage 
actively in hostilities.61 
Contrary to the evolution of the allowable age of direct participation 
in armed conflict in the Mrican Charter, I.L.O. Convention 182, and 
the Optional Protocol to the CRC, the Rome Statute for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court makes it a "war crime" to conscript or enlist 
children under the age of fifteen into national armed forces or use them 
to participate actively in hostilities.62 Despite the Rome Statute's con-
[d. 
Article 2: For the purposes of this Convention, the term child shall apply to all persons 
under the age of 18. 
Article 3: For the purposes of this Convention, the term the worst forms of child labour 
comprises: (a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and 
trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, 
including forced or compulsory recruiUnent of children for use in armed conflict .... 
59. The Mrican Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child arts. 2, 22, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990) (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999) [hereinafter Mrican Charter]. 
60. [d. art. 22, 1 3. 
61. The regional human rights treaties and declarations of the Americas do not define the 
age of majority or explicitly prohibit forced or compulsory recruiUnent of children of any age. See 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948); American Convention on Human 
Rights (1969); see ail'OAdditional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights "Protocol of San Salvador" (1988). Nevertheless, in 
Vargas Areco v. Paraguay, a case involving the recruiUnent of a fifteen year-old into the Paraguayan 
Army, and his subsequent death while serving in the army, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, recognized that " ... en el dereeho internacional existe una tendencia a evitar que se 
in corpore a personas menores de 18 anos en las Fuerzas Armadas, y a asegurar, en todo caso, que 
los menores de 18 anos de edad no participen directamente en hostilidades." Judgment of 26 
September 2006 1 122 (" ... in international law, there is a tendency to avoid the incorporation of 
persons younger than 18 years into the Armed Forces, and to ensure, in every case that those 
under 18 years of age do not participate directly in hostilities") (translation by author). 
62. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8,1 2 (b)(xxvi) ,July 17, 1998, U.N. 
DocA/Conf.183/9* (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. "Conscripting or enlisting children 
under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively 
in hostilities" is a war crime. [d. 
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tinuing emphasis on age fifteen, an international consensus appears to 
be emerging around raising the age of allowable direct participation in 
hostilities to eighteen years of age. 
States' obligations to children during armed conflict extend beyond 
merely refraining from recruiting them into their armed forces, accord-
ing to both global and regional legal instruments. During both interna-
tional and internal armed conflict children receive special affirmative 
protection under humanitarian law, in addition to blanket guarantees 
under Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions, prohibiting all 
states and other Parties to the Conflict, including dissident groups, 
from harming all persons taking no active part in the hostilities.63 
Under the Optional Protocol to the CRC, states are required to 
demobilize, release, and aid child soldiers in physical and psychological 
recovery and social reintegration.64 Article 39 of the CRC similarly 
states: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote 
physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of 
63. Convention (No. I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,6 V.S.T. 3114, 75 V.N.T.S. 31. 
[d. 
In the case of anned conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to 
apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of anned 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by 
sickness, wounds, detention ... shall in all circumstances be treated hu-
manely .... To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited 
at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned 
persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples. 
64. Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note 54, art. 6, 1 3. "States Parties shall, when 
necessary, accord to these persons all appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological 
recovery and their social reintegration." [d. 
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a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; 
torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery 
and re-integration shall take place in an environment which 
fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child.65 
Under the Mrican Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 
states are required to "take all feasible measures to ensure the protec-
tion and care of children who are affected by armed conflicts,,,66 in 
addition to respecting the norms of international humanitarian law 
relevant to children in armed conflict.67 Although the Americas have 
not signed a substantively equivalent charter, the General Assembly of 
the Organization of American States issued a Summit Declaration in 
June 2000 urging its members to consider signing and ratifying the 
Optional Protocol to the CRC, to adopt I.L.O. Convention 182 without 
delay, and to support efforts at demobilization, rehabilitation, and 
reintegration into society of children affected by armed conflicts.68 In 
addition, the Geneva Convention (No. IV) Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Times of War mandates that Parties to a conflict 
shall take appropriate action to "ensure that children under fifteen 
who are orphaned or separated from their families as a result of the 
war, are not left to their own resources, and that their maintenance, the 
exercise of their religion and their education are facilitated in all 
circumstances .... ,,69 The same Convention also states that women, 
and presumably girls, are entitled to special protection from "any 
attack on their honor" including rape, prostitution, and assault.70 
B. States'Duty to Prosecute Persons Who Commit Crimes Under 
International Criminal Law 
A state that fails to prosecute an individual-child or adult-who 
vioiates international criminal law may find itself in violation of interna-
tionallaw. If a person commits certain international crimes, a state may 
be obligated to prosecute him or her under international treaty and 
65. CRC, supra note 4, art. 39. 
66. African Charter, supra note 59, art. 23, 'I 3. 
67. Id. art. 23, 'I 1. 
68. Summit Declaration on Children and Armed Conflict, GA. Res. 1709, OA.S. GAOR, 
June 5, 2000, AG/Res. 1709 (2000). 
69. Convention (No. IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War an. 24, 
Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T 3114,75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
70. Id. art. 27. 
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customary law,71 even if these crimes are committed against the state's 
own nationals.72 For example, the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide explicitly binds states to "under-
take to prevent and to punish,,73 the crime of genocide.74 Similarly, the 
Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment establishes that States Parties must criminal-
ize torture7S under its domestic law and "shall make these offenses 
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their 
grave nature.,,76 
Although various treaties, such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,77 the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,78 and the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights79 do not explicitly state that states 
are obligated to prosecute violations, they may implicitly and through 
subsequent interpretation require prosecution to protect the fundamen-
71. Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 
Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2540 (1991). 
72. [d. at 2555. 
73. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9, 
1948,78 V.N.T.S. 277 (entered intoforceJan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
74. [d. art. 2. The crime of genocide is defined as carrying out certain enumerated acts with 
the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group .... " Id. 
75. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 1, Dec. lO, 1984, 1465 V.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter 
Torture Convention]. Torture is defined as: 
Id. 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
76. [d. art. 4. 
77. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 V.N.T.S. 171 
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
78. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950,213 V.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
79. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 21, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 
V.N.T.S. 143 (entered intoforceJuly 18,1978). 
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tal rights they enumerate and seek to protect.80 Furthermore, the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
indicates that a state violates customary law if it "practices, encourages 
or condones" severe human rights violations, and it will be presumed to 
be encouraging or condoning "if such acts, especially by its officials, 
have been repeated or notorious and no steps have been taken to 
prevent them or to punish the perpetrators.,,81 The Preamble to the 
Rome Statute suggests a growing international consensus toward requir-
ing prosecution and punishment, explicitly recalling that "it is the duty 
of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible 
for international crimes" and affirms "that the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by 
taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international 
cooperation." 82 
Nevertheless, some believe that during cases of internal strife, the 
decision to prosecute rests on domestic criminallaw.83 Article 3 com-
mon to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, although prohibiting 
parties to a conflict from harming unarmed civilians in an internal 
conflict, contains no "grave breaches" provision mandating criminal 
punishment,84 making the duty or decision to prosecute dependent on 
domestic law. Furthermore, Article 6(5) of the Protocol II to the 
Geneva Conventions, addressing the protection of victims during inter-
nal conflicts, seems to encourage amnesty over prosecution, implying a 
dissimilar duty to prosecute in internal rather than international 
conflicts:85 "At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall 
endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have 
participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for 
reasons related to the armed conflict .... ,,86 
Despite these interpretations of Article 6(5) of Protocol II and 
Common Article 3, the international community advocated for crimi-
nal tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, even though those 
80. Orentlicher, supra note 71, at 2568-69. 
81. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RElATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987), 
as cited in Orentlicher, supra note 71, at 2582-83; BURNS WESfON, RICHARD FALK, & HilARY CHARLEs-
WORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENfED CoURSEBOOK 538 (1997). 
82. Rome Statute, supra note 62, at pmhl. 
83. Reis, supra note 41, at 631).40; Karen Gallagher, No justice, No Peace: The Legalities and 
Realities of Amnesty in Sierra Leone, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 149, 176 (2000). 
84. Reis, supra note 41, at 636. 
85. Gallagher, supra note 83, at 176. 
86. Protocol II, supra note 51, art. 6(5). 
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conflicts were internal. This advocacy reflects a duty to prosecute 
serious violations of international humanitarian law.87 Furthermore, 
when the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General for 
Sierra Leone signed the Lome Peace Accord of 1999, he was instructed 
to add a disclaimer "to the effect that the amnesty provision contained 
in article IX of the Agreement (,absolute and free pardon') shall not 
apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity or 
other serious violations of international humanitarian law,,,88 explicitly 
rejecting the idea ofa broad amnesty. Consequently, a state's failure to 
prosecute a child who commits a serious violation of international law 
may itself be in breach of international law. 
C. The Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility for Child Soldiers 
At what age the duty to prosecute applies to international humanitar-
ian crimes such as crimes against humanity and war crimes committed 
by children appears unresolved under the statutes of recent human 
rights tribunals and the Rome Statute. Although the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia89 and for Rwanda90 do 
not address the minimum age of criminal responsibility, both stress the 
importance of prosecuting and punishing those responsible; their 
silence does not necessarily preclude prosecution of children under 
87. E.g., Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 
827, art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter IC1Y Statute]. "The International 
Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Statute. " [d. 
88. Secretary General, The Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a SPecial Court for 
Sierra Leone, U.N. SCaR, 1: 23, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000) [hereinafter Sierra Leone 
Report]. 
89. IC1Y Statute, supra note 87, art. 6. "The International Tribunal shall have jurisdiction 
over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the present Statute." [d. 
90. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, annex art. 1, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8,1994) [hereinafter ICfR Statute]. 
[d. 
338 
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in 
the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Statute. 
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these mechanisms.91 The Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, however, explicitly 
allows for all persons aged fifteen and above to fall under the jurisdic-
tion of the Court.92 The Rome Statute does not include persons under 
eighteen at the time of commission of a crime within its jurisdiction, 93 
although it is a war crime to conscript or enlist children under age 
fifteen into armed forces. 
Treaty law on the treatment of juveniles undergoing ordinary domes-
tic criminal prosecutions similarly acknowledges the lack of consensus 
on the minimum age of criminal responsibility, showing the absence of 
both treaty and customary norms. The CRC recognizes not only the 
differences of opinion regarding the definition of a "child," describing 
a child as "every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, 
under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier,,,94 but 
also the broad scope of views regarding the age at which children may 
be prosecuted, and it calls on States Parties to set a minimum age.95 
The U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice ("Beijing Rules") echo the variety in the age of criminal respon-
sibility among states: 
91. Amnesty Int'l, Child Soldiers: Criminals or Victims? 8, AI Index: lOR 50/002/2000, Dec. 22, 
2000. 
92. Sierra Leone Report, supra note 88. The Secretary General calls for those "most 
responsible" to be tried. Id. Paragraph 31 states: 
Id. 
Within the meaning attributed to it in the present Statute, the term 'most responsible' 
would not necessarily exclude children between 15 and 18 years of age. While it is 
inconceivable that children could be in a political or military leadership position 
(although in Sierra Leone the rank of "Brigadier" was often granted to children as 
young as 11 years), the gravity and seriousness of the crimes they have allegedly 
committed would allow for their inclusion within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
93. Rome Statute, supra note 62, art. 26. "The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any 
person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime." Id. 
Id. 
94. CRC, supra note 4, art. 1. 
95. Id. art. 40. 
3. States Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, 
authorities and institutions specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused 
of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law, and, in particular: 
(a) The establishment of a minimum age below which children shall be 
presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law .... 
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It should be noted that age limits will depend on, and are 
explicitly made dependent on, each respective legal system, 
thus fully respecting the economic, social, political, cultural 
and legal systems of Member States. This makes for a wide 
variety of ages coming under the definition of ~uvenile,' rang-
ing from 7 years to 18 years or above. Such a variety seems 
inevitable in view of the different national legal systems and 
does not diminish the impact of these Standard Minimum 
Rules.96 
The Beijing Rules further add that the lower limit should not be set "at 
too Iowan age level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and 
intellectual maturity.'>97 In the same vein, although the most recent 
international treaty on juvenile delinquency defines a juvenile as any 
child under age eighteen, it requests that states determine "an age 
below which it should not be permitted to deprive a child of his or her 
liberty,,,98 while providing no direction for what that lower limit should 
be. A 1997 UNICEF report on the progress of the CRC illustrates the 
wide variety of the age of criminal liability: twenty in Japan, seven in 
India, South Africa, and Sudan, ten in England, thirteen in France, 
sixteen in Argentina, eighteen in Peru, and fourteen in China.99 
Despite the lack of an explicit consensus in the statutes of interna-
96. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, G.A. 
Res. 40/33, Annex, cmt. to Rule 2.2, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53 at 207, U.N. Doc. 
AI 40 I 53 (1985) [hereinafter Beijing Rules]. 
ld. 
97. ld. at rule 4; ld. at cmt. to rule 4. 
The minimum age of criminal responsibility differs widely owing to history and culture. 
The modem approach would be to consider whether a child can live up to the moral 
and psychological components of criminal responsibility; that is, whether a child, by 
virtue of her or his individual discernment and understanding, can be held responsible 
for essentially anti-social behavior. 1£ the age of criminal responsibility is fixed too low or 
if there is no lower age limit at all, the notion of responsibility would become 
meaningless .... 
98. United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty, G.A. Res. 
45/113, annex, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49Aat 205, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990). "11. For 
the purposes of the Rules, the following definitions should apply: (a) Ajuvenile is every person 
under the age of 18. The age limit below which it should not be permitted to deprive a child of his 
or her liberty should be determined by law .... " ld. 
99. UNICEF, Progress of Nations 1997: Special Protections, Progress & Disparity [hereinafter 
UNICEF Report], http://www.unicef.org/pon97/p56a.htm. 
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tional criminal tribunals and the absence of a customary norm regard-
ing the exact minimum age of criminal responsibility for international 
humanitarian crimes, interpretation of the CRC in light of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties may point to a legal obligation to 
refrain from prosecuting at least children under fifteen for serious 
crimes arising from armed conflict. Article 31 of the Vienna Conven-
tion states as a "General Rule of Interpretation" that "[a] Treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose."100 
The preamble to the CRC repeatedly addresses the need and commit-
ment of the Parties to provide special protections for children; it recalls 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 101 in which the UN 
"proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assis-
tance,,,102 and the Declaration of the Rights of the Child,103 stating, 
"the child by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs 
special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protec-
tion .... "104 By setting the minimum age for recruitment and use at 
fifteen, the drafters of the CRC pointed to the need to protect children 
from the dangers of war, in accord with international humanitarian 
law.105 In addition to the psychological and physical dangers of war, the 
100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(enteredintoforceJan.l,1980). 
101. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. I, 
Resolutions, at 71 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
102. CRC, supra note 4, at pmbl. 
103. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 
Supp. No. 16 at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959). 
104. CRC, supra note 4, at pmbl . 
105. In the working group, when discussing at what age to set the prohibition on recruit-
ment, several countries expressed the desire not to violate international humanitarian law with 
respect to the child, and some hoped to raise the age of allowable participation in direct 
hostilities. Nigel Cantwell, The Origins, Development and Significance of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, in THE UNITED NATIONS CoNVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A GUIDE 
TO THE "TRAVAUX l'REPARATOJRES" 19, 27 (Sharon Detrick ed., 1992). Despite these efforts, the 
United States 
alone but clearly benefiting from the silent stipport of several other delegations-
categorically refused to give such protection to the fifteen to seventeen age-group. 
Despite vociferous opposition, the Chainnan declared that, since there was no consen-
sus on the upper age limit and no delegation was arguing for an age-limit under fifteen, 
this clearly implied that there was consensus on age fifteen. With that, he immediately 
closed the debate. 
[d. Despite the uproar that ensued, the text remained at under age fifteen. [d. 
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prohibition on both forced recruitment and use of children under age 
fifteen in direct hostilities suggests that the States Party to these treaties 
believed children under fifteen do not possess the mental maturity to 
express valid consent to join an armed group. If children under fifteen 
are not sufficiently mature to consent to engage directly in armed 
conflict and must be protected from the dangers of war under the CRC, 
they arguably are more like victims of armed conflict than its perpetra-
tors. In agreement with this interpretation of the CRC, the Sierra 
Leone Report allows for the prosecution of only children aged fifteen 
and over while recognizing the victimhood of all child soldiers.106 
Similarly, the Rome Statute makes it a war crime to conscript or enlist 
children under age fifteen in armed conflict. 107 
The Rome Statute and the Optional Protocol to the CRC arguably 
demonstrate an emerging consensus that children aged fifteen to 
eighteen should also be shielded from criminal liability. Although it is a 
war crime to conscript or enlist children aged under fifteen according 
to the Rome Statute, the international community expressed a prefer-
ence for not prosecuting persons aged fifteen through seventeen by 
limiting the ICC'sjurisdiction to persons aged eighteen and over at the 
time of commission of a crime.108 Furthermore, since the Optional 
Protocol precludes States Parties from allowing children under eigh-
teen to participate in direct hostilities, they should be protected from 
criminal liability if they are used in armed conflict. Finally, the CRC 
itself prefers the measures most "conducive to the realization of the 
rights of the child" when the CRC and domestic law or domestic treaty 
obligations differ, suggesting that the higher the age of allowable 
recruitment and criminal responsibility, the better. lOg 
[d. 
106. Sierra Leone Report, supra note 88, i 32. 
The possible prosecution of children for crimes against humanity and war crimes 
presents a difficult moral dilemma. More than in any other conflict where children 
have been used as combatants, in Sierra Leone, child combatants were initially 
abducted, forcibly recruited, sexually abused, reduced to slavery of all kinds and 
trained, often under the influence of drugs, to kill, maim and bum. Though feared by 
many for their brutality, most if not all of these children have been subjected to a 
process of psychological and physical abuse and duress which has transformed them 
from victims into perpetrators. 
107. Rome Statute, supra note 62, art. 8,' 2(b) (xxvi). 
108. [d. art. 26. 
109. CRC, supra note 4, art. 41. "Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any 
provisions that are more conducive to the rights of the child and which may be contained in: (a) 
the law of a State party; or (b) International law in force for that State." [d. 
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D. Protective Guidelines for Children Undergoing Prosecution 
In addition to the affirmative obligation to reintegrate former child 
soldiers into society as previously noted, if a state chooses to prosecute a 
former child soldier for violations of domestic or international criminal 
laws, he or she is entitled to special protections under international law. 
As delineated in Article 3 of the CRC, "in all actions concerning 
children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institu-
tions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."llo As well 
as providing a variety of procedural safeguardslll for children accused 
of criminal activity, such as presumption of innocence, knowledge of 
charges against him or her, and rights of privacy and appeal, Article 40 
of the CRC articulates that such a child should be: 
treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the 
child's sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces the child's 
respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
others and which takes into account the child's age and the 
desirability of promoting the child's re-integration and the 
child's assuming a constructive role in society.1l2 
Rule 5 of the Beijing Rules similarly establishes that the aims of juvenile 
justice should include an emphasis on the "well-being of the juvenile" 
and a consideration of the individual circumstances of the offense and 
the offender, including examination of individual social status, family 
situation, and gravity of the crime in fashioning an appropriate re-
sponse.113 In the same vein, in describing the powers and duties of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Article 54 of the Rome 
Statute charges the Prosecutor with considering both incriminating 
[d. 
1l0. [d. art. 3. 
llI. [d. art. 40, t 2. 
112. [d. art. 40, 11 l. 
113. Beijing Rules, supra note 96, at rule 5; [d. at cmt. to rule 5. 
The response to young offenders should be based on the consideration not only of the 
gravity of the offence but also of personal circumstances. The individual circumstances 
of the offender (for example social status, family situation, the harm caused by the 
offence or other factors affecting personal circumstances) should influence the propor-
tionality of the reactions (for example by having regard to the offender's endeavor to 
indemnify the victim or to her or his willingness to tum to wholesome and useful life ) . 
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and exonerating circumstances, which presumably might include the 
age of the alleged offender, in deciding whether to investigate and 
prosecute crimes.114 In deciding how a child offender should be 
punished, the CRC,115 the ICCPR,116 and the Beijing Rules117 specify 
that capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons under age 
eighteen, and the CRC and Beijing rules state that deprivation of 
liberty of a child "shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for 
the shortest appropriate period of time.,,118 
If a state is obligated or chooses to prosecute a child who allegedly 
114. Rome Statute, supra note 62, art. 54. 
Duties and powers of the Prosecutor with respect to investigations 
[d. 
1. The Prosecutor shall: 
(a) In order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover all facts 
and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsi-
bility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and 
exonerating circumstances equally; 
(b) Take appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and 
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and in doing so, 
respect the interests and personal circumstances of victims and witnesses, 
including age, gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, and health, and 
take into account the nature of the crime, in particular where it involves 
sexual violence, gender violence or violence against children .... 
115. CRC, supra note 4, art. 37(a). "No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprison-
ment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below 
eighteen years of age." [d. 
116. ICCPR, supra note 77, art. 6(5). "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes 
committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant 
women." [d. 
117. Beijing Rules, supra note 96, at rule 17.2. "Capital punishment shall not be imposed for 
any crime committed by juveniles." [d. 
118. CRC, supra note 4, art. 37(b). "No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully 
or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law 
and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time." 
[d. See also Beijing Rules, supra note 96, at rule 17(b)-(c). 
[d. 
344 
17(b). Restrictions on the personal liberty of the juvenile shall be imposed 
only after careful consideration and shall be limited to the possible mini-
mum. 
17 (c). Deprivation of personal liberty shall not be imposed unless the 
juvenile is adjudicated of a serious act involving violence against another 
person or of persistence in committing other serious offences and unless 
there is no other appropriate response. 
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committed international crimes, the state must also ensure that the 
child meets the substantive intent requirements for commission of the 
crime. Since these often severely abused children frequently were 
forced to commit crimes under duress or to take desensitizing drugs, 119 
the requisite mens rea may not be present. Although in the commission 
of certain crimes the order of a supervisor ordinarily does not shield a 
suspect from liability,120 since children under fifteen presumably do 
not possess the mental maturity to volunteer to participate directly in 
armed conflict, they are probably insufficiently mentally developed to 
resist an order from a supervisor. If drugs were involved, the child likely 
did not possess the necessary will to perform the acts at all. Further-
more, in the case of genocide, the mens rea requirement is even more 
complex and difficult to fulfill; a child must possess the "intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious 
group.,,121 A child soldier under the age of fifteen or even eighteen may 
not satisfy this intent requirement because he or she may not under-
stand the meaning of the crime itself.122 
E. Summary of International Law on Prosecution of Child Soldiers 
Although a duty to prosecute exists in cases of grave international 
crimes, special rules apply to child soldiers who meet the requisite 
criteria for the commission of those crimes, including mens rea. Interna-
tional treaty and customary law indicate the existence of an age below 
which states should not find children criminally responsible. Because 
the purpose of the CRC is to protect children, and states are prohibited 
from recruiting or using children under age fifteen in their armed 
Id. 
119. Sierra Leone Report, supra note 88. 
120. Rome Statute, supra note 62, art. 33. 
Superior Orders and Prescription of Law: 
1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a 
person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or 
civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless: 
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Govern-
ment or the superior in question; 
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and 
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful. 
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against 
humanity are manifestly unlawful. 
121. Genocide Convention, supra note 73, art. 2. 
122. Reis, supra note 41, at 645. 
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forces partly because they lack physical and mental maturity, they 
should not be held legally accountable for serious violations of intern a-
tional humanitarian law. If a state chooses to prosecute a child aged 
fifteen through seventeen, it must maintain procedural safeguards to 
protect the child's rights and consider his or her best interests and 
well-being throughout the judicial process. In determining what dispo-
sition to impose upon the child, states may not utilize capital punish-
ment for children under age eighteen and should consider the child's 
age and circumstances as mitigating factors. Finally, states have affirma-
tive obligations to seek to rehabilitate and reintegrate former child 
soldiers into society. 
PART III. POLICY GoALS 
A. Why Children Under Eighteen Should Not be Prosecuted 
Following any national crisis involving serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law, national healing includes elements of both 
"vengeance" and "forgiveness.,,123 According to Martha Minow, while 
vengeance in the wake of massive human rights violations includes the 
desire for revenge, justifiable moral outrage, and condemnation of 
repugnant misconduct,124 forgiveness is the need to move on, reestab-
lish trustful relationships, and create the foundation for collective 
governance. 125 Focusing on forgiveness may result in a failure to 
punish those who commit egregious crimes, weaken the precarious 
rule of law in a fledgling democracy, and fail to deter the proscribed 
conduct in the future. 126 Emphasizing vengeance may undermine a 
fragile transition to democracy through politically charged trials, par-
ticularly if the military maintains some degree of control. 127 Ultimately, 
"peacemaking does more than end war; it lays the normative ground 
for transition and sets the agenda for peace time.,,128 When the time for 
peacemaking arrives, children under age eighteen should not be 
prosecuted and punished, as an adult might be. Although they are 
perpetrators of armed conflict, and in some cases have committed 
gruesome acts, children should be recognized primarily as its victims. 
123. See generally MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY 
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MAss VIOLENCE (1998). 
124. Id. at 10-14. 
125. Id. at 14-15. 
126. Orentlicher, supra note 71, at 2542. 
127. Id. at 2544-45. 
128. Cohn, supra note 5, at 131. 
346 [Vol. 38 
REHABIliTATION OR REVENGE 
They should occupy a role in the peacemaking process129 that recog-
nizes their vulnerabilities, with a view toward their rehabilitation. 
The international community should set the minimum age of respon-
sibility at eighteen years old for serious crimes arising from armed 
conflict. As more and more children participate directly in armed 
conflict and in human rights violations, practical concerns, unfortu-
nately, require a concrete policy delineating which children, if any, 
should be held responsible for international crimes. The CRC, the 
Beijing Rules, and the Machel Report all call for the establishment of a 
minimum age of criminal accountability. 130 Although the setting of any 
minimum age of criminal responsibility is somewhat arbitrary and may 
be over and under-inclusive in terms of moral culpability, the cut-off 
chosen should maximize opportunities for rehabilitation for former 
child soldiers and protect as many young people as possible from long 
deprivations ofliberty in chaotic post-conflict states. It should also be in 
accord with the general purposes of the CRG-protection and promo-
tion of children's rights-and consider the psychological and moral 
development of children. The Machel Report states that a child's 
"emotional, mental and intellectual maturity" should be taken into 
account, instead of "subjective or imprecise" criteria such as personality 
or puberty.131 Choosing the age of eighteen as the lower limit for 
criminal accountability recognizes the state of adolescents' psychologi-
cal and moral development, and refraining from prosecuting persons 
below this age promotes the underlying rehabilitative goals of the CRC. 
Psychological studies show a child's understanding of the world is 
fundamentally altered during adolescence, suggesting he or she does 
not possess the same abilities to act independently or appreciate the 
rights of others as an adult and should be shielded from liability for 
crimes arising from war. A child's grasp of the political world changes 
dramatically between ages twelve or thirteen and fifteen or sixteen; a 
child's cognitive mode changes, his or her authoritarian views of the 
political system sharply decline, and he or she achieves a capacity for 
ideology.132 While older children are capable of shifting back and forth 
between concrete examples and abstract generalizations or principles, 
129. See generaUy id. (supporting the proposition that children's concerns should be consid-
ered in the peacemaking process). See also Machel Report, supra note 1,132. 
130. CRC, supra note 4, art. 4O(3)(a). See Beijing Rules, supra note 96, at rule 4; Machel 
Report, supra note 1,1251. 
131. Machel Report, supra note 1, 1 251. 
132. Adelson, supra note 3, at 106-08. 
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younger children are generally limited to concrete examples. 133 Younger 
children are usually incapable of imagining social reality in the ab-
stract; an early adolescent: 
enters adolescence with only the weakest sense of social institu-
tions, or their structure and functions, or of that invisible 
network or norms and principles which link these institutions 
to each other. Furthermore, the failure to achieve abstractness 
does not permit him to understand, except in a most rough and 
ready way, those concepts essential to political thought-such 
ideas as authority, rights, liberty, equity, interests, representa-
tion, and so on.134 
Younger children also have a difficult time understanding the concept 
of individual and minority rights juxtaposed with state power.135 Al-
though adults are not shielded from liability for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity because they were following orders,136 if children do 
not know how to question state or organized authority or understand 
the concept of rights, they should not be held criminally accountable 
for following orders. 
Similarly, significant changes in moral development may also occur 
during adolescence,137 supporting the idea that holding children 
accountable for violations of the laws of war may be inappropriate 
when they are too young to hold independent moral views. Although 
not every person passes through every stage of moral development at 
the same age, or ever, Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan suggest 
the sequence of stages is universal across at least three cultures: Taiwan, 
the US, and Mexico. 138 Generally, post-conventional thought, or "a 
major thrust toward autonomous moral principles which have validity 
and application apart from authority of the groups or persons who 
hold them and apart from the individual's identification with those 
133. [d. at 108. 
134. [d. at 109. 
135. [d. at 118. When asked whether an imaginary island government should require men 
over forty-five to undergo annual medical examinations, while most younger adolescents deemed 
this a "splendid idea," older children questioned whether it might be an excessive state intrusion. 
[d. 
136. Rome Statute, supra note 62, art. 33. 
137. Lawrence Kohlberg & Carol Gilligan, The Adolescent As A Philosopher, in TwELVE TO 
SIXTEEN, supra note 3, at 144, 161-62. The Kohlberg/Gilligan article bases its conclusions on 
studies of boys' moral development only. 
138. [d. 
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persons or groups" first appears at adolescence.139 One example of the 
shift from conventional to post-conventional thinking in a child's 
understanding of motives for rule obedience occurs at stage 5A: 
1. Obey rules to avoid punishment. 
2. Conform to obtain rewards, have favors returned, and so on. 
3. Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by others. 
4. Conform to avoid censure by legitimate authorities and result-
ant guilt. 
5A. Conform to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator 
judging in terms of community welfare. 
5B. Conform to avoid self-condemnation.140 
If a child does not understand that he or she may choose to disobey 
an order to protect community welfare or to avoid self-condemnation, 
it may be inappropriate to hold him or her accountable for crimes 
when ordered by a supervisor or in the context of collective armed 
action. 
Further, prosecuting children under age eighteen is inconsistent 
with the underlying goals of the CRC: to promote the best interests and 
well-being of the child. The default rule for the age of the child is 
eighteen, differing only when he or she attains majority earlier under 
the domestic law applicable to the child.141 The CRC specifically states 
that the best interests of the child "shall be a primary consideration" in 
all actions concerning the child.142 It further specifies that States 
Parties should undertake all feasible measures to care for and protect 
children in armed conflict,143 and that states must seek to promote 
physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of child 
victims of armed conflict. l44 Recovery and re-integration is meant to 
take place "in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and 
dignity of the child.,,145 The CRC itself states that States Parties should 
promote the establishment of measures for children accused of violat-
ing penal law "without resorting to judicial proceedings.,,146It proposes 
a variety of dispositions including counseling, vocational training, and 
139. [d. at 161-62. 
140. [d. at 161. 
141. CRC, supra note 4, art. 1. 
142. [d. art. 3. 
143. [d. art. 38. 
144. [d. art. 39. 
145. [d. art. 39. 
146. [d. art. 40. 
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other alternatives to institutional care to ensure that "children are dealt 
with in a manner appropriate to their well-being and proportionate 
both to their circumstances and the offence.,,147 The eRe discourages 
the use of deprivation of liberty as an adequate disposition, stating that 
it "shall only be used as a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
appropriate period oftime.,,148 
Trials are not in the best interest of former child soldiers. They are 
less likely to promote their well-being and social reintegration than 
primarily rehabilitative measures or other post-conflict accountability 
methods. From a practical standpoint, many post-conflict, transitional 
governments cannot prosecute children while upholding the proce-
dural safeguards of the eRe. For example, the twenty percent of the 
judiciary that survived the conflict in Rwanda 149 simply could not 
expediently process the thousands of children that were detained while 
protecting their rights. In June 1996, 1741 children were being held in 
detention "in dreadful conditions" in Rwanda, and 550 of these chil-
dren were under fifteen years old. 150 Two years later, children still 
lacked legal assistance, and no child-specific legal procedures were in 
place.151 According to the Mrica News Service, only 1500152 of the 
approximately 4000153 children accused of participating in the Rwan-
dan genocide had been released from detention by November 14, 
2001. 
Even if a child is pardoned or provided with a disposition other than 
a deprivation of liberty after undergoing a trial,154 the process itself 
[d. 
3. States Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, 
authorities and institutions specifically applicable to children alleged as, 
accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law, and, in particu-
lar ... 
(b) Whenever appropriate and desirable, measures for dealing with such 
children without resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that human 
rights and legal safeguards are fully respected. 
147. [d. 
148. [d. art. 37. 
149. Machel Report, supra note 1, 1 252. 
150. [d. 1 250. See aLm Cohn, supra note 5, at 18&87. 
151. Cohn, supra note 5, at 186. 
152. ArRICA NEWS SERVICE, supra note 46. 
153. LA. TIMES, supra note 47. 
154. Ultimately, in a final agreement between Sierra Leone and the UN, a Special Court was 
set up which would allow for children aged fifteen to eighteen to be prosecuted, but if found 
guilty, would serve no jail time. Chris McGreal, Unique Court to Try Killers of Sierra Leone, THE 
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may threaten the child's psychological healing by making him or her 
re-live trauma, delaying the return of any semblance of normalcy, and 
making it more difficult for him or her to reintegrate into society, 
particularly if the trial is public. While telling the truth about perpetrat-
ing or being a victim of a crime may be an integral part of the 
psychological recovery process, without adequate support and care, it 
may be damaging for a child;I55 an adversarial process like a trial is 
likely to aggravate a child's distress, instead of providing a supportive 
environment for healing. On the other hand, "done well, determina-
tions of moral culpability for abuses committed both against and by 
children can advance the child's moral development and reinsertion 
into a family or community.,,156 Although it may thwart a victim's 
legitimate desire for justice, putting child soldiers on trial endangers 
their reintegration and rehabilitation into society. 
Because of their youth and victimhood, post-conflict societies should 
focus on rehabilitation, rather than punishment of former child sol-
diers. These children have been more wounded by the world than vice 
versa. Even children who "volunteer" to join an armed group are driven 
to do so by hunger, poverty, political or cultural pressures, fear, and 
desire for protection. 157 Mter being deliberately exposed to atrocious 
human rights violations like rape, murder, and maiming, or being 
forced to commit such violations themselves, many of them become 
completely desensitized to violence. I5s Particularly in cases of abduc-
tion or forced recruitment, these children are ripped out of their 
community and familial networks; they live, suffer abuse or die at the 
whim of their superiors. 
Instead of prosecuting children under age eighteen, post-conflict 
governments should seek alternative methods of addressing the needs 
of victims of child soldiers and their communities while rehabilitating 
the child soldiers themselves. Truth commissions may serve as a viable 
alternative to trials as long as procedures" (1) do not conflict with local 
healing methods, and (2) incorporate the supportive programs neces-
GUARDIAN, Jan. 17, 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/sierra/article/ 
0,2763,634697,00.html. It is unlikely that any children will be charged, however, since the focus is 
to be "on very few people who bear the greatest responsibility for what happened in Sierra Leone 
over the years." [d. 
155. Cohn, supra note 5, at 180-8I. 
156. [d. at 18I. 
157. See generally Machel Report, supra note 1, 11 36-43 (saying that some parents even 
encourage their daughters to become soldiers "if their marriage prospects are poor"). See generally 
Cohn, supra note 5. 
158. Machel Report, supra note 1,148. 
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sary to enhance the therapeutic value, and minimize any negative 
impact, that participating in a truth-seeking process might have on 
child victims, witness and perpetrators, and on their care-givers and 
communities." 159 
In South Mrica, the Truth and Reconciliation Committee chose not 
to elicit testimony from children for fear of inflicting more pain on 
them, although it did hear adults speak of their experiences as chil-
dren.160 Neither truth commissions nor trials may ultimately be the 
answer to this quandary; the Machel Report highlights the importance 
of culturally appropriate, community-based methods for helping to 
heal child soldiers and encouraging communities to reintegrate them. 
Because some Mrican cultures believe that accepting a person who has 
killed into the community will lead to evil spirits, any social reintegra-
tion and forgiveness process must include traditional healers and 
"cleansing" processes.161 In one village in Angola, after living with a 
former child soldier for one month, feeding him a special cleansing 
diet while advising the child on proper village behavior, a traditional 
healer convened the village for a ceremony where he buried a fre-
quently used weapon such as a machete or an AK-47 and declared the 
boy's life as a soldier ended and life as a civilian begun.162 In Mozam-
bique, a child taken by RENAMO at age eight participated in collective 
prayer and singing in a local church where he was welcomed back as a 
member of his community.163 No matter which specific methods are 
chosen for handling the reintegration of child soldiers into their 
communities in the wake of mass violence, the child's psychological 
and physical well-being and dignity must be taken into account. The 
focus should be on forgiveness when children are involved. 
B. Applying International Relations Paradigms to the Child Solder 
Quandary 
International relations theory is part of an international lawyer's 
"toolkit" for achieving specific policy goals,164 such as setting the age of 
159. Cohn, supra note 5, at 182. 
160. MINOW, supra note 123, at 85. 
161. Machel Report, supra note 1, '155. 
162. Mike Wessells, Child Soldiers: In Some Places, ijYou'reas TaU as a Rifle, You're Old Enough to 
Carry One, 53 BULL. ATOM. SCI. 6, '1'1 62-63 (1997), available at http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/ 
1997 /nd97 /nd97wessells.html. 
163. Mercedes Sayagues, Mozambique-Children: Cleansing Rites to Heal Buy Soldiers, INTER. PREss 
SERVICE, Nov. 14,1995, as cited in Reis, supra note 41, at 652. 
164. Hague Lecture I, supra note 6, at 30. 
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criminal responsibility at eighteen for child solders engaged in human 
rights abuses and promoting their rehabilitation. Institutionalism's and 
Liberalism's positive assumptions about who the principal players in 
the international system are and what motivates them can influence 
strategies for achieving normative goals such as mutual policy adjust-
ment, or cooperation.165 In Anne-Marie Slaughter's words, "excavating 
and challenging assumptions about the nature and form of the interna-
tional system emerges as an essential component of legal analysis, an 
effort to understand the realm of the possible and expand the realm of 
the probable.,,166 
1. The IR Paradigms: Liberalism and Institutionalism 
The three core assumptions of Liberalism in the international rela-
tions context are: (l) the primary actors in international politics are 
individuals and private groups; (2) states represent a subset of domestic 
society, and state officials define and promote international policy 
based on this subset's beliefs; and (3) the preferences of other states 
shape state behavior.167 Through this international relations lens, 
domestic constituencies, non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), 
intergovernmental organizations ("IGOs"), and states seek to shape or 
have their own beliefs reflected through a particular government's 
policy choices.168 Whether and how governments perceive a particular 
group's demands determines if they become part of the state's agenda. 
Actors attempt to mobilize public opinion around a specific norm with 
the goal of its adoption by official decision-makers and often with the 
hope it will filter up to international institutions.169 Consequently, 
according to the Liberal paradigm, the best way to achieve common 
ends is by "changing individual and group preferences or by ensuring 
that they are accurately represented," ultimately resulting in aligned 
state interests.170 
Institutionalism's "top-down"l71 perspective, on the other hand, 
posits that: (1) states are the primary actors in the international system; 
165. Id. at 26-30. 
166. Id. at 28. 
167. Moravcsik, supra note 8, at 516-20. 
168. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations- The Role of NGOs in 
International Law-Making, 285 RECUEIL DES COURS 96, 101, 105-12 (2000) [hereinafter Hague 
Lecture III]. 
169. See id. at 1l0-12. 
170. Hague Lecture I, supra note 6, at 42. 
171. See id. at 35-39. 
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(2) states engage in the pursuit of power in an anarchic world; (3) 
institutions can allow states to cooperate in the long-term by modifying 
anarchy to achieve common goals when common interests are present; 
and (4) institutions can have an independent impact on state behav-
ior. 172 Institutions, or "rules, norms, principles and decision-making 
procedures,,,173 can "provide information, reduce transaction costs, 
make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordina-
tion, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity.,,174 Institu-
tions not only provide a locus for establishing standards of behavior, 
but also increase the cost of non-compliance with norms.175 
Both Liberals and Institutionalists wrestle with how preferences arise 
in the first place.176 Like the "chicken or the egg" dilemma, they ask 
whether the international system shapes state preferences or vice versa. 
While Rationalists posit that cold calculation based on current realities 
determines policy choices, Constructivists believe that socialization or 
"ingrained psychological or cultural impulse" results in state prefer-
ences.177 Alternatively stated, Constructivists posit that "shared ideas, 
expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behavior are what give the 
world structure, order, and stability,,,178 and these shared ideas or 
"social facts"179 can be altered. "Norm entrepreneurs" or "agents 
having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their 
community,,180 can help foster the creation of convergent state inter-
ests and mobilize domestic constituencies to pressure their govern-
ments to alter their policies. A norm or "standard of appropriate 
behavior"181 can be modified through the actions of norm entrepre-
neurs.182 
172. Keohane & Martin, supra note 7, at 41-44; See also Hague Lecture I, supra note 6, at 36-37. 
But see John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 J. INT'L SEC. 5 (1995) 
(arguing that institutions do not have an independent impact on international outcomes). 
173. Hague Lecture I, supra note 6, at 35. 
174. Keohane & Martin, supra note 7, at 42 (stating that institutions can have an "indepen-
dent" impact when controlling for the effects of power and interests). 
175. See Hague Lecture I, supra note 6, at 36-37. 
176. See id. at 43. 
177. Id. at 44. 
178. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Nurm Dynamics and Political Change, 
52 INT'L ORG. 887, 894 (1998). 
179. Hague Lectures I, supra note 6, at 47. 
180. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 178, at 896. 
181. Id. at 891. 
182. Id. at 896-97. 
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ll. The Paradigms Applied: Creating and Institutionalizing a New 
Nonn 
Strategies crafted from both Institutional and Liberal standpoints 
may be employed to encourage states to refrain from prosecuting child 
soldiers under age eighteen, and to focus, instead, on their rehabilita-
tion and reintegration. From the Liberal perspective, child advocates 
can pressure key decision makers by mobilizing public opinion. For 
example, they may construct new "cognitive frames"183 through which 
to view these children, transfonning the fonnerly appropriate possibil-
ity of prosecuting child soldiers into an inappropriate measure endan-
gering the rehabilitation of child victims.184 Through publications, 
studies, documentaries, and other consciousness-raising activities, Lib-
erals can attempt to alter domestic perceptions, substituting the image 
of deadly child soldiers committing atrocities with that of children 
robbed of their childhoods and severely scarred by their experiences. 
In addition, interested parties can lobby decision makers to change 
state policy by showing them it is in their state's economic and social 
interest to do so: trials and detentions create long-term economic costs, 
particularly when children are involved; states in the wake of mass 
violence will likely violate the procedural and substantive guarantees 
mandated by international law in submitting children to judicial pro-
ceedings; and the social trauma to communities and children forced to 
relive soldiering experiences may be difficult to endure. 
As they seek to change domestic preferences, Liberal nonn entrepre-
neurs will likely be faced with "a highly contested nonnative space 
where they must compete with other nonns and perceptions of inter-
est, ,,185 including a legitimate desire for justice from the victims of child 
soldiers in the wake of mass violence. In Sierra Leone and Rwanda, 
domestic groups explicitly called for the prosecution of youth involved 
in mass violence; the Sierra Leone Report states, 
The Government of Sierra Leone and representatives of Sierra 
Leone civil society clearly wish to see a process of judicial 
accountability for child combatants presumed responsible for 
the crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court. It was 
said that the people of Sierra Leone would not look kindly 
183. [d. at 897. 
184. See Hague Lecture I, supra note 6, at 43-45 (comparing "appropriate" and "instrumen-
tal" behavior). 
185. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 178, at 897. 
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upon a court which failed to bring to justice children who 
committed crimes of that nature and spared them the judicial 
process of accountability. 186 
The same report points out that child-focused NGOs were "unanimous 
in their objection" to judicial accountability for these children for fear 
it would endanger rehabilitation efforts. 187 Liberals concerned with 
protecting former child soldiers must use the arguments at their 
disposal to convince the domestic population, find a way to have their 
views better represented in the governing elite, and encourage other 
states to pressure their elites. 
While Liberals think pressure from domestic constituencies and 
other states is an effective way to alter the disposition of child soldiers, 
Institutionalists will look to current institutional frameworks, converg-
ing state interests, and the development and implementation of new 
institutions in pursuing this change. First, Institutionalists can argue 
that current international law of the child and norms of juvenile justice 
require states to refrain from prosecuting former child soldiers under 
eighteen,188 and if they fail to comply, states will suffer reputational 
costs. By prosecuting children, an Institutionalist child advocate might 
argue, a state is not acting in the "best interests" of the child, as the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child demands,189 and other states 
may seek to shame the rogue state into compliance. Alternatively, if 
current international law is not sufficiently explicit to convince states 
the costs of non-compliance are high, Institutionalists might raise other 
reasons for this important shift in policy toward former child soldiers, 
such as avoiding the economic costs of trials and detention or the 
possible failure to comply with juvenile justice norms. 
When state interests converge around raising the age of criminal 
responsibility to eighteen and focusing efforts on the rehabilitation of 
former child soldiers, Institutionalism posits that states will seek to 
institutionalize their new understanding. States could make clear, 
either through the Optional Protocol to the CRC or otherwise, that 
children should be considered primarily victims of armed conflict and 
should not be prosecuted, or the Rome Statute could be changed to 
criminalize the use of child soldiers under the age of eighteen instead 
of fifteen, emphasizing child soldiers are victims until age eighteen. 
186. Sierra Leone Report, supra note 88, 'I 35. 
187. Id. 
188. See supra part II.C. 
189. CRC, supra note 4. 
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Once an expected behavior or rule is codified in a binding way, such as 
by modifying a treaty, the reputational costs of non-compliance are 
higher than prior to the existence of the codified change. 
Like Liberal norm entrepreneurs, Institutionalists will encounter 
obstacles in their attempts to show states why it is in their interest to 
institutionalize this new view of child soldiers. Despite some signs of an 
emerging consensus around the age of eighteen as the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law, 
the current focal point of fifteen may present a hurdle, or at least 
institutional drag. International humanitarian law's proscription of the 
use of children under age fifteen is a clear, recognized benchmark age 
around which states have expressed consensus in the past. Although 
the Rome Statute establishes the lower limit of criminal responsibility 
at age eighteen, the ICC's success is still in question/90 and the Rome 
Statute only criminalizes the use of child soldiers under the age of 
fifteen. Even though the Optional Protocol to the CRC prohibits any 
use of children under age eighteen in direct hostilities, it still allows 
children age fifteen and over to volunteer to join a Party's armed 
forces. Finally, in the Sierra Leone Report, the Secretary General used 
the age of fifteen as a minimum age of criminal accountability, suggest-
ing the current institutional framework, at least as embodied in the 
U.N. Secretary General's Report, considers prosecuting persons under 
age eighteen a legitimate, although unfortunate, measure.191 
Assuming state interests are malleable/92 norm entrepreneurs such 
as child-centered NGOs, friendly states, and institutions can work to 
alter this perception of child soldiers. Further, because norms focusing 
on vulnerable groups tend to be more widely accepted and adopted,193 
norm entrepreneurs may enjoy a higher likelihood of success in 
shifting the understanding of child soldiers from perpetrators to 
victims. As long as Institutionalist "norm entrepreneurs" can convince a 
core group of states to alter their policies, it is likely a new norm will 
190. On May 5,2002, the United States announced that it does not consider itself bound by 
the treaty establishing the ICC. Powell Says U.S. to Abandon Pact fur Wurld Tribuna~ N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 
2002. 
191. See Sierra Leone Report, supra note 88, n: 32-38. 
192. Hague Lecture III, supra note 168, at 111. 
193. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 178, at 907 (proposing that norms involving "bodily 
integrity and prevention of bodily harm for vulnerable or 'innocent' groups, especially when a 
short causal chain exists between cause and effect" are more successfully translated into concrete 
policy changes than norms with other intrinsic characteristics). 
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emerge. 194 Then, it may "cascade" to other states due to "pressure for 
conformity, desire to enhance international legitimization, and the 
desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem.,,195 Transnational 
advocacy networks196 like the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child 
Soldiers and individual NGOs like Human Rights Watch may serve as 
Rationalist "institutional enablers,,197 by showing states that the long-
term benefits of protecting and focusing their efforts on rehabilitating 
children outweigh their short term costs. They may also target institu-
tions themselves to pressure states to comply with norms.198 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the best way to solve the dilemma of what to do with child 
soldiers who violate international humanitarian law, however, is by 
eliminating the use of children as soldiers altogether. Actors have taken 
both Liberal and Institutional steps to achieve this goal. In 2002, the 
U.N. Secretary General's former Special Representative on Children 
and Armed Conflict, Mr. Olara Otunnu, implicated both Institutional-
ist and Liberal paradigms when emphasizing the need both for better 
monitoring mechanisms that would "name and shame" states using 
child soldiers and for local networks of civil organizations actively 
promoting children's rights:199 
The international community has done very well in terms of 
developing and elaborating norms, standards and rules against 
the use of child soldiers. . . . But where we have not been 
effective is their application on the ground. Words on paper do 
not save a child in war. 200 
Since that time, the Optional Protocol to the CRC has become much 
more widely ratified, and better monitoring mechanisms to embarrass 
194. [d. at 895 (supporting the proposition that persuasion by norm entrepreneurs leads to 
the emergence of new norms once a critical mass of states is convinced). 
195. [d. (The norm "cascade" is followed by norm "internalization"; "norms acquire a 
taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate."). 
196. Hague Lecture III, supra note 168, at 107.(l9. 
197. [d. at 104. "Enabling NGOs are typically pushing states down a path they have already 
chosen, at least in some degree. The constructivist task is to widen and deepen their preferences 
for environmental preservation, or arms control, or economic integration-but not create those 
preferences ah initio." [d. at 105. 
198. [d. at Ill. 
199. Norimitsu Onishi, Children of War in Sierra Leone Try to Start Over, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,2002. 
200. [d. 
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countries into compliance are being implemented. For example, the 
U.N. Secretary General established an action plan for the creation of a 
monitoring and reporting mechanism on children in armed con-
flict,201 and a report about the Democratic Republic of Congo was 
submitted to the U.N. Security Council Working Group last year.202 
Also, the ICC's first prosecution is against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a 
former leader of a militia group in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, for enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 
fifteen,203 a sign of the importance the world community is putting on 
protecting its most vulnerable members. Nevertheless, much remains 
to be accomplished, particularly in rehabilitating former child soldiers. 
The current U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative on Chil-
dren and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, has called for 
increased focus on "long-term developmental responses that will result 
in meaningful re-integration ... " of former child solders.204 Prosecut-
ing those who conscript and enlist children is an important and 
essential preventive measure, but it affords no remedy for children 
already subject to the horrors of armed conflict. 
In its preamble, the CRC aspires to a world where children grow in "a 
family environment, an atmosphere of happiness, love and understand-
ing.,,205 Two million children were killed in armed conflict from 1986 
to 1996 and three times as many were seriously injured or permanen tly 
disabled.206 Instead of growing up in the ideal set out by the drafters of 
the CRC, the Machel Report describes our world as "[a] space devoid of 
the most basic human values; a space in which children are slaugh-
tered, raped, and maimed; a space in which children are exploited as 
soldiers; a space in which children are starved and exposed to extreme 
brutality.,,207 
The trauma these children suffer and their psychological develop-
201. See s.c. Res. 1612, '1'12-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1612 (July 26,2005). 
202. Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict, Statement of Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, Under-Secretary-General, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict, at 2, U.N. SCaR, 61st Sess., 5494th mtg. at 4, S/PY.5494 (July 24, 
2006) [hereinafter SC Record). 
203. Press Release, International Criminal Court, Child Soldier Charges in the First Interna-
tional Criminal Court Case (Aug. 28, 2006), available at http://www.icc-{;pi.int/ press/ pressreleases/ 
174.html. 
204. See, SC Record, supra note 202, at 5. 
205. CRC, supra note 4, at pmhl. 
206. Machel Report, supra note I, 12. 
207. Id.1 3. 
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ment at the time of their crimes mandates that we treat them as 
victims, not perpetrators of armed conflict, and that we seek to 
rehabilitate them. Although international law arguably requires the 
prosecution of severe violations of human rights, it also establishes 
that the best interests of children are paramount and reflects an 
emerging trend toward forbidding the use of children under eigh-
teen in direct hostilities. By mobilizing domestic constituencies and 
states, international child advocates can institutionalize this trend 
and implement better monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to 
keep children off battlefields. Advocates can use both Institutional-
ist and Liberal understandings of the international system to encour-
age states to refrain from prosecuting former child soldiers and 
focus on their rehabilitation-to work toward making this a world 
"fit for children.,,208As demonstrated by the statement drafted, 
debated, and agreed to by child delegates from one hundred 
countries during the May 8-10,2002 Children's Forum of the United 
Nations Special Session on Children, perhaps the children of the 
world will themselves call us to task: 
360 
We pledge an equal partnership in this fight for children's 
rights. And while we promise to support the actions you take on 
behalf of children, we also ask for your commitment and 
support in the actions we are taking-because the children of 
the world are misunderstood. 
We are not the sources of problems; we are the resources that 
are needed to solve them. 
We are not expenses; we are investments. 
We are not just young people; we are people and citizens of 
this world. 
Until others accept their responsibility to us, we will fight for 
our rights. 
We have the will, the knowledge, the sensitivity and the 
dedication. 
We promise that as adults we will defend children's rights 
with the same passion that we have now as children. 
We promise to treat each other with dignity and respect. We 
promise to be open and sensitive to our differences. 
208. Statement of Children, supra note 9. 
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We are the children of the world, and despite our different 
backgrounds, we share a common reality. 
We are united by our struggle to make the world a better 
place for all. 
You call us the future, but we are also the present.209 
209. [d. 
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